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Abstract
The Scope of this ar? cle is to show that the modern Subject, which is being considered to 
be an ac? ve agent, in reality is reaching its demise. Furthermore, this ar? cle will explicate the 
nature of the modern subjec? vity/man, par? cularly its ability to construct knowledge, as its 
exegesis being done by modern thinkers and in due course of showing that this subjec? vity/
man is near its demise. This ar? cle will try to explicate a cri? que of modern subjec? vity/man 
through the spectacles of Michel Foucault.
In this ar? cle the focus will remain on Kant for the exegesis of modern subjec? vity/man 
as he is the most profound propagator of modern subject. In the second stage it will focus on 
Foucault’s Archaeological analysis since he has developed an argument that the demise of 
modern subject is near and inevitable.
Key words: Kant Model of Knowledge, Copernican RevoluƟ on, Michel Foucault Epistemol-
ogy, Grid of Specifi caƟ on. 
Modern Subjec? vity/Man
From the onset of the modernity, specifi cal-
ly Enlightenment, the claim of it was to provide 
freedom to the subject who is enslaved in the 
shackles of Religion, mulƟ ple authoriƟ es and 
classical thought etc. Peter Gay puts it like this, 
“the men of enlightenment united on a vastly 
ambiƟ ous program, a program of secularism, 
humanity, cosmopolitan, and freedom, above 
all freedom in its many forms” (Gay, 1995,p.3)
Similarly Kant, the most infl uenƟ al of all 
modern thinkers, put forth that enlightenment 
is a process of freeing mankind from the shack-
les of authoriƟ es as he says “Enlightenment 
means emergence from self imposed immatu-
rity. Immaturity is the inability to use own un-
derstanding without the guidance of others” 
(Kant, 1996) 
Although there could be several interpreta-
Ɵ ons of self imposed immaturity but the one 
which the arƟ cle at hand considers over here 
is epistemological. We all are aware of Kant’s 
Copernican RevoluƟ on. By this Copernican Rev-
oluƟ on Kant, provided modern subjecƟ vity/
The Nearing Demise of Modern 
Subject/Man
TalhaI? ikhar1
Email: talhai? ikhar@yahoo.com
47Research
Market Forces
College of Management Sciences
Vol. X,  No. 2
December 2015
1 The author is a faculty member at Khadim Ali Shah Bukhari InsƟ tute of Technology, Karachi.
man, the acƟ ve subject, central posiƟ on in the 
process of construcƟ ng knowledge.
Kant, instead of considering man a passive 
subject, as Hume did, who only receives in-
formaƟ on from objects rather made man an 
acƟ ve agent, a construcƟ ve and central sub-
ject in the process of formaƟ on of the knowl-
edge. 
Therefore, in this sense Kant liberated 
mankind from the self imposed immaturity 
of not being an acƟ ve agent capable of con-
strucƟ ng the edifi ce of knowledge. Therefore, 
to Kant man becomes central epistemologi-
cally and hence it is consider as Epistemolog-
ical Anthropocentricity.
Kant’s Model of Knowledge
This secƟ on will briefl y expound the mod-
el of knowledge Kant discovered. It will also 
elaborate the role of Man, as Kant consid-
ered, in the formaƟ on of knowledge and lim-
its of this modern subject as well.
For Kant, all knowledge starts from our 
sensaƟ ons/representaƟ ons of object. But 
these representaƟ ons which one receives are 
possible only due to subjecƟ vity a priori con-
diƟ ons i.e. Space and Time. For Kant, space 
and Ɵ me are subjecƟ ve a priori condiƟ ons for 
the possibility of representaƟ ons of objects. 
Although Kant’s exegesis of Space and Time is 
diﬀ erent from that of Newton’s and Leibniz’s. 
It was fi rst Ɵ me in the history of Mankind that 
Space and Time were argued as something 
subjecƟ ve a priori condiƟ ons rather being 
considered as absolute or relaƟ onal.
As stated that it was for the fi rst Ɵ me that 
Space and Time became subjecƟ ve condi-
Ɵ ons. As per Kant, “We should, indeed, know 
it completely but always under the subjecƟ ve 
condiƟ ons of Space and Time – CondiƟ ons 
which are originally inherent in Subject” 
(Kant, 1929. p. 83) 
These SubjecƟ ve condiƟ ons don’t have any 
value apart from Human Subject, “It is, there-
fore, solely from the human stand point that 
we can speak of space, of extended things, 
etc” (Kant, 1929) These are just condiƟ ons 
of possibility of experience. That’s why Kant 
called these subjecƟ ve a priori condiƟ ons of 
experience as Transcendental. 
For Kant, the process of knowledge starts 
when a subject gets representaƟ ons from the 
external world under the subjecƟ ve specta-
cles of space and Ɵ me. But this process only 
completes when subject being an acƟ ve agent 
do synthesis of the raw material i.e. represen-
taƟ ons received. The funcƟ on of synthesis is 
being done by faculty of understanding. In 
addiƟ on Kant argued that both representa-
Ɵ ons and thought have disƟ nct funcƟ ons and 
one can’t negate the importance of any one 
of them. As Kant puts it “These two powers 
or capaciƟ es cannot exchange their posiƟ ons. 
The understanding can intuit nothing, the 
sense can think nothing. Only through their 
union can knowledge arises” (Kant, 1929. p. 
93) Kant claims that he has discovered the 
structure of human thought/understanding. 
This structure consist of 12 categories (Kant, 
1929) and he further claims that this struc-
ture of thought is universal and absolute. 
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Now here it’s important to highlight the 
role of KanƟ an Subject. Kant claims that he 
has brought the Copernican RevoluƟ on in the 
fi eld of knowledge. In this whole process of 
formaƟ on of knowledge the priority of sub-
ject is very evident. “That all representaƟ ons/ 
combinaƟ ons is the only one which cannot 
be given through the object. Being an act of 
self acƟ vity of subject, it cannot be executed 
save by the subject itself” (Kant, 1929. p. 152)
This KanƟ an subject is not a product or a re-
sult of the process of synthesis rather it is one 
which is prior to the very process of synthesis 
through which knowledge is formulated. In oth-
er words, this acƟ ve agent is being presupposed 
by the process of formaƟ on of knowledge. This 
subject became Transcendental i.e. condiƟ on 
for the possibility of knowledge at Kant and this 
is his Copernican RevoluƟ on. This is his epis-
temic Enlightenment and liberaƟ on of mankind 
from the self imposed immaturity of not being 
an acƟ ve agent capable of construcƟ ng the edi-
fi ce of knowledge.
Since KanƟ an subject can’t know the things 
as they are but only can know as they appear to 
the subject, this is due to the subjecƟ ve spec-
tacles of Space and Time. Subject due to these 
spectacles cannot know things as they are i.e. 
Noumena, only can know things as they appear 
to subject. Although things as they exist; but 
they are not knowable to the subject because 
they don’t agree with the subjecƟ ve precondi-
Ɵ ons of experience and therefore, remain a sort 
of skepƟ cism regarding the knowledge of things 
as they are . This further means though subject 
may not be able to know things as they are but 
then the subject has all capability of construct-
ing knowledge of the world as it appears to the 
him i.e. Man! Subject/Man has the capacity to 
build the whole edifi ce of Knowledge.   
It’s evident from the above stated points 
that Kant’s subject is not just prior to the pro-
cess of formaƟ on of Knowledge but also a pre-
condiƟ on for the possibility of knowledge i.e. 
subject is a priori condiƟ on for the possibility 
of Knowledge. SubjecƟ vity/Man is all prior to 
the process of formaƟ on of knowledge and has 
acquired a central posiƟ on in the process of for-
maƟ on of knowledge. This subjecƟ vity not only 
consƟ tutes knowledge of phenomenal (things 
as they appears) world but also gives meaning 
to it. When one receives  manifolds of represen-
taƟ ons from the world at that Ɵ me these are 
noƟ ng but meaningless bundles, it’s the Sub-
ject/Modern SubjecƟ vity/Man that synthesis 
those bundles and produce knowledge from 
them.
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Before Kant, it was thought that all knowl-
edge i.e. concepts created by Thought or fac-
ulty of understanding must conform with the 
object of knowledge. In other words spectator 
should revolve around the object of knowl-
edge. But he considers that it would be beƩ er 
if we assume that all objects must conform to 
our Knowledge i.e. Thought of Man. Kant just 
inverted the relaƟ on between spectator and 
the object. Therefore, knowledge depends 
upon this spectator, this modern subjecƟ vity/
Man and this is Kant’s Epistemological Anthro-
pocentricity.
Foucault’s Cri? cism of Kan? an 
Subjec? vity/Man
In this secƟ on the arƟ cle will try to excavate 
the FoucaulƟ an criƟ cism of KanƟ an SubjecƟ vi-
ty/Man on two planes. Firstly it will show that 
the subject don’t have that epistemological 
anthropocentric status as it appears at Kant. 
Secondly it will then try to show that this mod-
ern subjecƟ vity/Man will have an end as it had 
a beginning. The arƟ cle’s whole focus will re-
mains in the Archaeological invesƟ gaƟ ons of 
Michel Foucault.
In the previous secƟ on we have briefl y 
sketched the KanƟ an subject and its role in the 
formaƟ on of knowledge. But there appears 
certain quesƟ ons that needs to be addressed. 
Some of these quesƟ ons are: Is subject really 
having freedom and capable to consƟ tute the 
edifi ce of knowledge? Has subject acquired 
anthropocentric status? Is this subject really a 
per-condiƟ on for the possibility of knowledge? 
Has this KanƟ an subject transcends the history 
and aƩ ains a-historical, a-cultural status? Does 
this subject give order to things? And if not 
then what is that which gives order to things 
and govern them? The arƟ cle will certainly try 
to provide answers to these quesƟ ons from 
the FoucaulƟ an perspecƟ ve
It was a passage from Chinese encyclopedia 
of animals that enforced Foucault to write his 
famous work “The Order of Things”. As Fou-
cault himself stated that, “This book fi rst arose 
with a passage from Borges, out of the laughter 
that shaƩ ered” (Foucault, 2002. p. xvi) It was 
the complexity, diﬃ  culty and mere impossibil-
ity to understand the Chinese Classifi caƟ on of 
animals which Foucault accepts as well. This 
led him to inquire and write the whole book. 
Why Foucault was unable to understand that 
taxonomy of animals since he and the Chinese 
writer of the encyclopedia share the same 
structure of thought and share same concep-
Ɵ on of subject! This is because the Chinese en-
cyclopedia has a diﬀ erent system of thought 
working employed at its basis than that of 
Modern thought. It was the diﬀ erence of sys-
tems of thought that makes Foucault laugh 
at that taxonomy and led him to confess his 
inability to understand that taxonomy of ani-
mals. As per Foucault, “In the wonderment of 
this taxonomy, the thing we apprehend in one 
great leap, the thing that, by means of fable, is 
demonstrated as the exoƟ c charm of another 
system of thought, is the limitaƟ on of own, the 
stark impossibility of thinking that” (Foucault, 
2002, p. xvi) This led Foucault to start thinking 
that there are diﬀ erent systems of thoughts 
and the meaning/ordering of things depends 
upon the systems of thoughts. Once the sys-
tem of thought changes with it the whole or-
dering/meaning of things changes as well.
It has been menƟ oned that the focus of the 
arƟ cle will be on Foucault’s Archaeological In-
quiry, but what is Archaeology?
“Foucault’s archaeology goes beneath the 
conscious level to reveal the epistemic ‘uncon-
scious’ that defi nes and make possible individ-
ual knowledge” (Guƫ  ng, 2001, p268) Foucault 
in the foreword of “The Order of Things” ex-
pressed his aim of this archaeological inquiry 
that he wanted to uncover the PosiƟ ve Uncon-
scious of the Knowledge. By PosiƟ ve Uncon-
sciousness he means those epistemological 
principles that work beneath the whole sphere 
of knowledge of any parƟ cular era. Although 
these epistemic principles are part of any sci-
enƟ fi c inquiry but such part that escapes the 
consciousness of the scienƟ st himself. As he 
elaborated: “What I would like to do, howev-
er, is to reveal a posiƟ ve unconsciousness of 
knowledge: a level that eludes the conscious-
ness of the scienƟ st and yet is part of scienƟ fi c 
discourse” (Foucault, 2002,p. xi)
It means that through Archaeological inqui-
ry Foucault wanted to reveal those intellectual 
structures that lie beneath as fundamentals 
which produces/control and order the enƟ re 
fi eld of knowledge of any parƟ cular epoch. Yet 
those fundamentals are so much obvious that 
the scienƟ st of that parƟ cular epoch remains 
unconscious of them.
Those fundamentals that work beneath the 
surface of discourses and yet control them are 
known as Episteme or epistemic principles. 
Episteme are those epistemological principles 
that are employed beneath the whole sphere 
of knowledge of any parƟ cular era. All the dis-
courses of any parƟ cular era or epoch employ 
same epistemic principles.
Another imperaƟ ve regarding this epis-
temic fi eld is that this gives order/meaning to 
discourses and these discourses gives order/
meaning to other things including man. It’s 
Episteme that classify them, relates them with 
one another and construct a meaningful rela-
Ɵ on between them, in short govern them.
Foucault’s claim can be verifi ed if one ana-
lyzes the current discourses of knowledge like 
Sociology, Psychology, Economics or Medicine 
etc, or any other posiƟ ve science; One would 
fi nd that what these discourses do is that they 
tell us the meaning of life and of world, what is 
knowledge and what is not, what one can say 
what’s not or what is fact and what is supersƟ -
Ɵ on.
Now the quesƟ on that whether these epis-
teme’s are absolute, universal and a-historical? 
Foucault argues that Episteme, basic episte-
mological principle of an epoch which render 
meaning, aims, purposes, does not remain 
same. There appear ruptures and disconƟ nu-
iƟ es among them. Whenever there appears a 
new order of things, or a certain way of analy-
ses of things or some unique discourse appears, 
than it’s a sign that there occurs some rupture 
at the epistemic level. Foucault’s major concern 
in his archaeological inquiry remains to point 
out those ruptures and disconƟ nuiƟ es that oc-
curred at the level of episteme.
According to Foucault, sphere of knowledge 
of any parƟ cular epoch is not something staƟ c. 
For him it’s not the case that once a parƟ cular 
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structure of knowledge is been discovered than 
that structure will remain unchanged and abso-
lute. There appear ruptures and disconƟ nuiƟ es 
among those structure and spheres of knowl-
edge. Whenever such ruptures appear than it 
means that there appears disconƟ nuity at the 
level of Episteme. Therefore, neither episteme 
are absolute nor they are universal or a-histori-
cal rather episteme are historical and parƟ cular.
Before moving further let’s see the diﬀ er-
ence between FoucaulƟ an and KanƟ an condi-
Ɵ ons for the possibility of Knowledge. In Kan-
Ɵ an perspecƟ ve, its categorizes the thought of 
subject due to which knowledge is possible. For 
Kant knowledge appears when a subject synthe-
size a bundle of representaƟ ons. This synthesis 
is being done by subjecƟ ve a-priori categories 
of thought. If these categories are not present 
than there appears no synthesis, judgment and 
further there will be no knowledge. This is the a 
priority of KanƟ an categories of thought.
Secondly, these categories are pure as well 
i.e. these are not the result of some representa-
Ɵ ons or judgments rather they have their seat 
in the Understanding/thought. “Pure concepts 
can, therefore, be characterized as concepts 
that have their origin (seat) in the nature of hu-
man understanding” (Allison, 2004,p. 116) In 
this way Kant claims that he has discovered the 
structure of thought. This structure of thought 
will remain same and a-historical. In this way 
KanƟ an categorizes are a-priori and a-historical 
and these are condiƟ ons for the possibility of 
knowledge.
For Foucault condiƟ ons for the possibili-
ty of knowledge are not subjecƟ ve. He claims 
that condiƟ on of the possibility of knowledge 
is Episteme. These episteme’s are neither pure 
nor a-historical rather for Foucault episteme’s 
are “Historical a-priori”
Foucault substanƟ ate his claim by taking 
three disciplines i.e. study of living creatures, 
study of exchange and study of language. Then 
by archaeological inquiry he found that all 
these disciplines follow same epistemic princi-
ple within a parƟ cular era. For the last 300 hun-
dred years of European history of these three 
disciplines he idenƟ fi ed two disconƟ nuiƟ es and 
ruptures. He idenƟ fi es three diﬀ erent Archaeo-
logical setup erupted from 16th century to 19th 
century as Renaissance, Classical Age and Mod-
ern Age. Every archaeological setup has its own 
peculiar episteme. These ruptures occurred at 
the level of Episteme. Therefore, Episteme are 
historical as they have a beginning and an end 
as well and all these episteme and discourses 
are developed in some Ɵ me so they are neither 
absolute nor they are universal as most mod-
ernist consider.
Although epistemes are historical but they 
are a-priori as well. Episteme of a parƟ cular ar-
chaeological system remains a-priori within it. It 
is prior to subject and to disciplines as well. As 
it is prior within a system therefore it not only 
consƟ tutes discipline but also carve subject as 
well.
Now to the quesƟ on that whether the sub-
ject/Man has that epistemological anthropo-
centric status as Kant claims?
In FoucaulƟ an terms that certainly is not the 
case. Modern subjecƟ vity/Man doesn’t have 
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that status since it’s not the subject who consƟ -
tutes the knowledge. Nor the subject has those 
categories which are condiƟ ons for the possi-
bility of knowledge. Its episteme that not only 
consƟ tute the sphere of knowledge and disci-
plines but also consƟ tute the modern subjec-
Ɵ vity/man as well. Man is not sovereign being, 
in epistemological sense, as propounded by the 
Kant rather man is an enslaved being consƟ tut-
ed by the modern episteme. For Foucault: “In 
one sense, man is governed by labor, life and 
language. His concrete existence fi nds determi-
naƟ ons in them” (Foucault, 2002, p. 341)
For Foucault, KanƟ an Copernican revoluƟ on 
is nothing but illusion. There is no such thing 
as sovereign subject capable of consƟ tuƟ ng 
knowledge. The quesƟ on is subject don’t have 
such a role as Kant claims? Foucault showed 
that subject/man is consƟ tuted by diﬀ erent 
historical events and disciplines of knowledge. 
Man’s whole being is determined and consƟ tut-
ed by these discourses and disciplines. 
If it’s not the subject that consƟ tutes the 
knowledge rather its epistemic principles that 
govern disciplines of knowledge than how 
these episteme’s do this? What are those epis-
temic condiƟ ons of knowledge? 
Foucault considers that any discipline ap-
pears due to three epistemic condiƟ ons. First 
of which is Surface of Emergence. By surface of 
emergence he means socio cultural condiƟ ons 
of the plain up on which a science is going to 
appears. Outside the surface of emergence no 
knowledge is possible. It means that for Fou-
cault the priority of life and cultural world is a 
basic epistemic condiƟ on for the possibility of 
knowledge. 
The other epistemic condiƟ on of forma-
Ɵ on of knowledge is Authority of DelimitaƟ on. 
These authoriƟ es are within cultural world. 
These authoriƟ es during the formaƟ on of dis-
course and discipline of knowledge play a vital 
role by forming the object of knowledge. The 
medical insƟ tute and medical discipline or biol-
ogy, consider each living being an organic object 
i.e. one which has several organs which works 
like a system. On the basis of these funcƟ ons of 
organs biology gives order to living beings. 
Before biology, Natural History classifi es liv-
ing beings on the basis of representaƟ onal as-
pect of living beings like bodily appearance etc. 
But in biology order is done on the basis of in-
ternal organism and their funcƟ ons which are 
not visible through naked eye like respiratory 
system or digesƟ ve systems etc. This object of 
study i.e. organic body was not present in nat-
ural history
The third is Grid of Specifi caƟ ons. It further 
expands the iniƟ al discourse. This is a system by 
which further branches of a discourse appears. 
Biology was than subdivided into botany and 
zoology etc. These two divisions were further 
divided into many subparts. This specifi caƟ on is 
done by grid of specifi caƟ on. In this manner the 
structure of knowledge develops and discours-
es fl ourish.
But sƟ ll if one thinks that man has central 
posiƟ on, epistemological anthropocentricity, 
and that man has such a designaƟ on that all 
other things revolves around him and that its 
man who is doing marvels in diﬀ erent fi eld than 
for Foucault “this imperious designaƟ on is am-
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biguous” (Foucault, 2002, p. 341) In reality man 
is “Enslaved Sovereign” (Foucault, 2002) Man 
and his concert existence is being governed 
by discourses like economics, medicine from 
psychology, language, sociology etc and apart 
these discourses no determinaƟ on of his con-
crete existence is possible. As Sheridan defi nes 
this concept of man as “The modern noƟ on of a 
creature who lives, speaks, and works in accor-
dance with the laws of biology, philology, and 
economics” (Sheridan, 1980, p. 77)
Foucault argues that apparently it seems 
that man has a very central posiƟ on since it is 
man who dissected animals and discovered bi-
ological and ecological systems. It is man who 
speaks and forms principles of philology and it 
is man who in response to his wants discovered 
the principles of economics. This implies that 
man as conceived by modernist is natural and 
a-historical
Furthermore, it seems illogical and mean-
ingless to speak of the beginning or the near 
demise of modern subject. For Foucault to give 
such central designaƟ on to Man is ambiguous. 
He idenƟ fi es birth of Man as “when natural his-
tory becomes biology, when analysis of wealth 
becomes economics and above all, refl ecƟ on 
upon language becomes philology, and clas-
sical discourse eclipsed, then in the profound 
upheaval of such archaeological mutaƟ on, man 
appears in his ambiguous posiƟ on as object of 
knowledge and as subject that knows: enslaved 
sovereign, observed spectator” (Foucault, 
2002, p.  340)
According to him, one is unable to observe 
not only the birth of Modern subject/Man but 
also its upcoming demise as well and this all 
is because of our short sidedness and lack of 
Memory. As per Foucault: “To imagine, for an 
instant, what the world and thought and the 
truth might be if man did not exist, is consid-
ered to be merely indulging in paradox. This is 
because we are so blinded by the recent mani-
festaƟ on of man that we can no longer remem-
ber a Ɵ me – and it is not so long ago – when the 
world, its order, and human beings existed, but 
man did not”(Foucault, 2002, p. 351)
Certainly it’s lack of memory that leads one 
to consider that the modern subject/man is a 
natural and a-historical being that has a long 
existence. We are so much accustomed to this 
concepƟ on of Man; this is such an apparent 
that one fails to see the historicity of it. Modern 
subject is so much obvious that one seems to 
be unable to apprehend its origin and similarly 
unable to conceive the world and life without 
modern subject.
If one study disciplines through archaeo-
logical methodology than it would become 
evident that the man is a recent invenƟ on, 
man is a product of diﬀ erent disciplines and 
discourses, that man is the outcome of a cer-
tain historicity. That’s why Foucault says that 
“before the end of the 18th century, man did 
not exist. He is a quite recent creature, which 
the demiurge of knowledge fabricated with its 
own hands less than two hundred years ago” 
(Foucault, 2002, p. 336) and Sheridan puts 
this like “Modern man—the man that stands 
at the centre of the three sciences to emerge 
from the collapse of representaƟ on” (Sheri-
dan, 1980, p. 77) and by representaƟ on Sheri-
dan means Classical Age.
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Man as Foucault highlighted is a product of 
modern episteme in general and Economics, 
philology and Biology in parƟ cular. Although 
there were humans in all episteme and in all 
archaeological systems but there was no sign 
of man as conceived by Modern Thinkers in 
general and Kant in parƟ cular.
One can fi nd the concept of mind/body in 
classical thought, one can fi nd humanism in 
the renaissance but one cannot fi nd any sign 
of man as conceived by modern thinkers in 
any other episteme. As per Foucault: “Renais-
sance “humanism” and classical raƟ onalism 
were indeed able to allot human beings a priv-
ileged posiƟ on in the order of the world, but 
they were not able to conceive of Man” (Fou-
cault,2002, p. 347)
Conclusion
As stated earlier that the aim of this paper is 
to analyze the FoucaulƟ an criƟ cism of KanƟ an 
concepƟ on of knowledge. Secondly, to show 
that the modern subject considered as acƟ ve 
agent due to its ability of construcƟ ng knowl-
edge is an ambiguous posiƟ on and fi nally de-
veloping an understanding that modern man 
is not natural, a-historical rather its historical.
For the above menƟ oned purpose one has 
observed the KanƟ an process of formaƟ on of 
knowledge. In it one found that knowledge 
starts with experience i.e. representaƟ ons 
which one gets from external world but alone 
these manifolds of representaƟ ons which are 
aƩ ained under subjecƟ ve condiƟ ons of space 
and Ɵ me are meaningless.
Furthermore, these manifolds of represen-
taƟ ons are synthesized through Faculty of Un-
derstanding/Thought which Kant claimed to be 
universal and absolute. Through process of syn-
thesis knowledge is being produces but if the 
subject, i.e. man, is not there than this process 
of synthesis won’t be possible. For Kant this is 
the funcƟ on of subject/man through which 
knowledge appears. Modern subject/man is 
able to perform such funcƟ on only because of 
the Copernican revoluƟ on. Kant Copernican 
revoluƟ on makes man central in the process of 
formulaƟ on of knowledge and also gives order/
meaning to the world.
On the other hand Foucault showed that 
KanƟ an understanding of subject was wrong. 
As per Foucault this formaƟ on of Knowledge is 
done by certain other elements. These are sur-
face of Emergence, AuthoriƟ es of DelimitaƟ ons 
and Grid of Specifi caƟ on being governed by 
some parƟ cular Episteme of any parƟ cular ep-
och. These episteme are historical not universal 
or natural, there appears ruptures and discon-
Ɵ nuiƟ es in it once there appears any change at 
Archaeological Level.
In process of formulaƟ on of knowledge 
through the above menƟ oned FoucaulƟ an 
CondiƟ ons of Knowledge not only object of 
Knowledge is formed but also subject. In mod-
ern era man appears as object of knowledge 
and subject of knowledge. Man, on one hand, 
is consƟ tuted by the modern episteme through 
discourses/disciplines. On the other hand, man 
is also object of study as well. It’s the study of 
man, as an object, through which diﬀ erent pos-
iƟ ve discourses appeared, like when one start-
ed studying madness than psychopathology as 
discourse appeared and started determining 
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man’s behavior. When man’s relaƟ on in market 
and labor become object of study that discours-
es like economics and development studies 
appeared and started determining man’s eco-
nomic life etc. That why Foucault believed that 
Man is enslaved.
As Foucault has idenƟ fi ed that there appears 
ruptures and disconƟ nuiƟ es on the Archaeo-
logical level and he showed how Renaissance 
as eclipsed and Classical age took its place 
and at the end of 18th century a disconƟ nui-
ty again occurred which resulted in the emer-
gence of Modern age and with it there occurred 
an invenƟ on i.e. the birth of Man. The logical 
outcome of Foucault’s thesis would be that 
this modern episteme and Modern Man both 
wound disappears. If there appeared any rup-
ture at Modern Archaeology than that would 
result in the disappearance of Modern Subject/
Man. Therefore to consider this Modern Man 
as Natural and a-historical is absolutely ambigu-
ous and Foucault’s answer to it would be noth-
ing but a Philosophical Laugh (Foucault, 2002).
Finally, Kant in his arƟ cle “What is Enlight-
enment”, which Foucault considered to be 
connected with his three CriƟ ques, considered 
that enlightenment means a criƟ cal aƫ  tude 
through which one should broke the shackles 
of immaturity. For him immaturity is to accept 
someone else authority while reason could 
guide oneself in that parƟ cular maƩ er. He fur-
ther goes on and defi nes enlightenment as an 
ongoing process.
Foucault criƟ cizes KanƟ an approach to en-
lightenment. He considered that KanƟ an en-
lightenment is self contradictory i.e. on one 
hand Kant claims enlightenment to be an on-
going process but then made his concepƟ on of 
man as universal and a-historical. According to 
Foucault enlightenment consist in an ongoing 
conƟ nuous criƟ cal aƫ  tude, “as a permanent 
criƟ que of our historical era” (Foucault, 1984, 
p. 32). Kant claims for criƟ cal aƫ  tude but goes 
against the very spirit of it. For Foucault enlight-
enment is ongoing criƟ cal processes through 
which one can fi nd out those events of rupture 
that occur at the level of Episteme.
References
Allison, Henry E. (2004). Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpreta? on and Defense. New Heaven, USA: 
Yale University Press
Foucault, M. (2002). The Order of Things. New York: Routledge Classics
Foucault, M., Rabinow, P., & Rogers D. Spotswood Collec? on. (1984).The Foucault reader. New York: Pantheon 
Books
Gay, P. (1995).  The Enlightenment: the Rise of Modern Paganism. New York: W.W Norton & Co
Gu?  ng, G. (2001).  French Philosophy in Twen? eth Century. New York: Cambridge University Press
Kant, I. (1929).  Cri? que of Pure Reason. New York: St Mar? n’s Press
Kant, I. (1996). “An Answer to the Ques? on: What is Enlightenment?” New York:  Cambridge University Press
Sheridan, A. (1980).  Michel Foucault: Will to Truth. New York: Routledge. 
